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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
Case No. 870449-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
DARRELL J. MCINTIRE, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from convictions after pleas of guilty in the 
Second District Court to two second degree feloniesf a third 
degree felonyf a Class A misdemeanor, and a Class B 
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether a law enforcement officer's "reasonable 
effort" to determine the place to be searched may include a 
review of the affidavit supporting the search warrant. 
II. Whether the substitution of a comma in the search 
warrant for what had been a plus sign or "and" abbreviation in 
the supporting affidavit was a "minimal technical deficiency" in 
the warrant's description so as not to invalidate an otherwise 
proper search. 
III. Whether the search warrant was valid if the police 
officer who obtained it had made reasonable efforts to determine 
the proper address and acted in "reasonable belief" that he was 
searching the proper location, but had failed to notice that 
another building not connected with the case carried the same 
address. 
IV. Whether the seizure of an RCA television was proper 
under the warrant and/or valid under the "plain view" exception 
to the warrant requirement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Darrell Mclntire was convicted after pleas of 
guilty in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge, 
presiding, of the following offenses: 
1. Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance 
(Methamphetamine), a Second Degree Felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-8(1)(ii) (1953); and 
2. Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute for Value (Methamphetamine), a Second Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-8 
(1953); and 
3. Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. Section 76-6-202 (1953); and 
4. Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 (1953); and 
5. Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 (1953). 
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These pleas were part of a negotiation wherein other counts 
and charges were dismissed by the State. Appellant does not 
attack the sufficiency of the pleas. Further, another theft 
charge was dismissed after the evidence was suppressed by Judge 
Roth in a hearing on August 25, 1987. (T.R. at 30). 
It should be noted that defendant's appeal issues are 
related only to the Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute and Class A Theft charges. The other 
offenses are not related to the issues raised in defendant's 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Though a trial was not held in this case, many of the facts 
were stipulated at the suppression hearing on August 24th and 
25th, 1987. Other facts are not in dispute. They are as 
follows: 
On April 12, 1987, there was a small, free-standing house 
located to the rear of a lot bearing the address 2210 Jefferson 
Avenue. It had no apartment numbers on it. To the South of 
this house, in which the defendant lived during all relevant 
dates, was a vacant area on the lot. An old four-plex occupied 
the front of the lot. It too had no apartment numbers on the 
doors, but was also known as 2210 Jefferson. 
On this date, reserve officer Dennis Garcia, working 
undercover for the Ogden Police, was assigned to attempt to 
purchase illicit drugs from a Roy Middlesteadt. The latter took 
Garcia to the small house at 2210 Jefferson, where the 
amphetamines comprising the "sales" charge were obtained from 
defendant Mclntire though Middlesteadt. 
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Sometime between April 12f 1987 and April 19, 1987, 
Middlesteadt moved his blue trailer to the vacant area just 
south of defendant's house. 
Officer Garcia returned to defendant's house on April 21, 
1988 to purchase LSD and amphetamines. While inside, he 
observed an RCA television similar to one a police confidential 
informant had told Officer Fronk of the Ogden City Police was 
stolen from the Flying "J" Motel in Weber County by defendant 
Mclntire. Fronk had investigated that case and was aware of the 
description of the television. Garcia also saw controlled 
substances and other evidence of criminal activity as listed on 
both the affidavit and the search warrant (cf Affidavit for 
Search Warrant). 
This information was conveyed to Detective Milt Garrett of 
the* Ogden Police, who drafted the search warrant and affidavit 
in question (T.R. at 15). Officer Fronk personally returned to 
defendant's house to verify Officer Garcia's observation of the 
address. He confirmed to Detective Garrett that it was 2210 
Jefferson. (T.R. at 15). At no time did the four-plex which 
occupied the ground near defendant's house become relevant to 
their investigation. Neither Garcia nor Fronk had a reason to 
look at it's address. 
Detective Garrett described the places to be searched in the 
Affidavit for Search Warrant as "2210 Jefferson + blue single 
trailer at south of house." As defendant has conceded in his 
brief (at p. 7) , the warrant for the trailer had nothing to do 
with Mclntire. It was to gather evidence against Middlesteadt. 
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In the body of the affidavit are "continual references to a 
house at 2210 Jefferson. There is no mention of an apartment or 
four-plex. . . " (as found by Judge Rothf T.R. at 29). 
In the search warrant itself. Detective Garrett described 
the places to be searched as "2210 Jefferson, blue single wide 
trailer parked at south of house", mistakenly substituting a 
comma for an "and" or "plus" sign. When read alone, this would 
justify the search of the trailer only. The search warrant was 
then signed by Judge Brent West of the Third Circuit Court. It 
was excecuted on April 22, 1987 by a group of officers which 
included Detective Garrett and Officer Fronk. (T.R. at p. 10 and 
24). 
Controlled substances were discovered in defendant's house, 
including the amphetamines forming the basis for the Possession 
with Intent to Distribute conviction. An RCA television 
matching the description of the one on the warrant, but for the 
fact that the serial number had been scratched off, was also 
found. (T.R. at 20). It was seized and is the subject of the 
Class A Theft conviction. Subsequently, it was learned that 
this T.V. had been stolen from a Travelodge in Ogden, not the 
Flying "J" Motel. 
A Goldstar VCR which was not listed on the search warrant 
was seized. It was suppressed by Judge Roth after defendant's 
motion to vacate the search on August 25, 1987. (T.R at p. 30). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The search warrant in the instant case 
specifically references the supporting affidavit. The affidavit 
specifically names the premises at 2210 Jefferson and the 
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trailer as places to be searched. The body of the affidavit 
names a house as the place to search at 2210 Jeffrsonf not an 
apartment complex. The search warrant was executed on the only 
house with a 2210 Jefferson address by the affiant and at least 
one other officer who had given information for the affidavit -
Officer Fronk. Adequacy of description is satisfied if an 
officer with a search warrant can "with reasonable effort" 
determine the place to be searched. In Utahf a "reasonable 
effort" can include a review of the affidavit that supports the 
search warrant. 
POINT II: A strong preference has been expressed for 
searches with warrants in Fourth Amendment cases. Officers here 
obtained a warrant. But for the insertion of the comma, which 
made the place to be searched different from that listed on the 
affidavit heading and the probable cause statement in the 
affidavit, the warrant and the affidavit were properly 
prepared. A minimal technical deficiency or oversignt on the 
warrant should not invalidate an otherwise proper search. 
POINT III: Defendant has not pointed to a reason why the 
officers should have noted that the address on an apartment 
complex, which was not part of their investigation, was the same 
as that on a house which was. Two police officers had 
specifically looked at the front of defendant's house to obtain 
his address. They obtained the correct address and transmitted 
this to the affiant for placement on the affidavit and warrant. 
No apartment numbers existed which would lead officers to 
believe that defendant's free-standing house was part of a 
larger apartment complex. The execution of the warrant was 
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valid because the officer's conduct was consistent with 
reasonable efforts to ascertain the place intended to be 
searched, even though, by the use of hindsight, it was overbroad 
as to address. 
POINT IV: The RCA television was properly seized pursuant 
to the warrant because it fit the description in the warrant, 
but for the serial numbers having been obliterated, a phenomenon 
not uncommon with stolen property. Even assuming it should not 
have been seized with the warrant, however, it was still the 
proper subject of seizure under the "plain view" exception to 
the warrant requirement. It was in plain view, the officers 
were lawfully on the premises, and they knew a television 
matching that description had been stolen from the Flying "J" 
Motel. They had confidential informant information that the 
defendant had stolen a TV with that description. The serial 
numbers had been removed. These facts would lead officers to 
the reasonable belief that the property was stolen. They had a 
duty to seize it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED DEFENDANT'S HOUSE 
AND THAT IT CAN BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT THE WARRANT FOR 
THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED 
A search warrant must particularly describe the place to be 
searched under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Perfect descriptions are not required. It "is enough if the 
description is such that the officer with a search warrant can 
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place 
intended." Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 45 S.Ct 414, 
416, 69 L.Ed 757 (1925). See also Daffinrud v. State, 647 P.2d 
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443 (Okla. Cr. 1982); State v, Cockrell, 689 P.2d 32 (Wash. 
1984); State v. Carlson, 618 P.2d 776 (Idaho 1980); and State v. 
McKenziey 608 P.2d 428 (Mont. 1980). 
In State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985) the Court 
held that "a law enforcement officer's 'reasonable effort' to 
determine the place to be searched under a warrant may include a 
review of the supporting affidavit." J^ d. at 1102. Though the 
search warrant in the instant case, when read alone, appears to 
permit the search of the blue trailer only, a review of the 
affidavit makes it apparent that the house at 2210 Jefferson is 
the intended search site. The description of the 2210 Jefferson 
premises is disjunctive with the trailer in the first paragraph 
and the probable cause statement is rife with references to the 
house at 2210 Jefferson and to Mclntire's house. Little exists 
in the affidavit even alluding to the house trailer and nothing 
exists mentioning the four-plex or an apartment complex of any 
description. In reviewing the affidavit to determine the place 
to be searched, the only place to obviously search is the house. 
In arriving at the Anderson decision, the Court adopted a 
three-prong test cited in Commonwealth v» Todisco, 363 Mass. 
445, 294 N.E.2d 860 (1973). The facts of the latter case are 
that the warrant described a building which housed three 
apartments. It did not describe which of the three was the 
defendant's. The Massachusetts court denied the motion to 
suppress evidence on three grounds: (1) the affidavit for the 
warrant more particularly described the place to be searched; 
(2) the warrant referred to the affidavit; and (3) the warrant 
was executed by the affiant personally. Anderson, at 1103. 
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Faithful to this preferencef Detective Garrett opted for a 
search warrant. Incorrect punctuation in the description led to 
the issues raised by defendant, even though the correct address 
was there. In State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986)
 f an 
incorrect street number did not invalidate a search warrant. 
The following language from the Utah Supreme Court is applicable 
to this case: 
Considering that the correct address appeared on the 
attached affidavit, as well as on other warrants and 
corresponding affidavits, the defect was minimal. 
•Minor technical deficiencies in the warrant's 
description1 , State v. Anderson [cited above], should 
not invalidate an otherwise proper search. 
Id at 392. 
When the affidavit is read with the warrant in defendant 
Mclntire's case, the defect of punctuation becomes a minor 
technical or clerical deficiency. The constitutionally preferred 
acquisition of a search warrant for conducting searches was used 
here. Probable cause was demonstrated to a magistrate. 
Punctuation should not invalidate the search. 
POINT III 
THE OFFICER'S FAILURE TO REALIZE THAT TWO SEPARATE 
BUILDINGS CARRIED THE SAME ADDRESS WAS OBJECTIVELY 
REASONABLE 
Officer Dennis Garcia had been to defendant's house at 2210 
Jefferson on at least two occasions prior to the issuance of the 
warrant. He had ascertained the address. To reiterate, no 
apartment numbers appeared on the house to indicate that it was 
an apartment. It was not physically connected to the apartment 
complex bearing the same numbers. No evidence has been adduced 
indicating illegal conduct at the four-plex; therefore, the 
police had no reason to notice it. Officer Fronk went to 
-10-
d e f f* n d a ! s ' « hour.o t r» »^r»r i f y officer G a i: c I a ' s a d dress. On ] y 
"i i m J lut J n»j evidence was seized d:i d evidence of the 
- :ientic;_! 1 street addtess com*/ t • - v 
•fc o p t i o n L u n 
Maryland v . G a r r i s o n - r J i c e 
s e a ; chec - M * a i i a r l d.-:<. i h i r ^ . l* ' prprrise. c l - ^ n r e 
Lilt : i ' * * - -y 
f o n ; d .i. . • w t - u * id-ru» ;«• - V J ,• * , . '. refusing 
t o s u p p r e s s t h i s «-•• i u<-» <-r-r :r< •*• ~ f- ^ bio^* ^  'reasonable 
be] 3 ef " • except: :: i i • ;.e 
i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e * . ; • . . : • j ' ^ ' i s t e n * w i " . f L ] c : t i v f ;y 
r e a s o n a b l e e f f o r t u i e ut f. rr : : t b u e t t d i n and 
JI i ifii I. i l y I in | > 11.11 * i intended to he s e a r c h e d , t h e fa^*- *"bat i t 
t ' i r p s out t o be ambiguous in scope w i l l nut i n v a l . -. . I d . 
a c o > • 
war r a n : . £ i r s u e u b s e q u e r * ' s « . *~ r \ of t i r t s 
d e n t o n s t r a t ii i i :j 1:1 1 a t a ; a ] :ii d w a i: i: a i: 11 \ i a s 1 1 :i 11 :i e c e s s a r ii 1  y lb i: o a d d o e s 
n o t r e t r o a c t i v e 1 y i i i v a 1 i d a t e t h e w a r r a n t "f 1 d a t 81 "T h e 
officerr made ever; i reasonabl e effort to deterrni ne the address. 
Ti I e * - 11 :t a t i t i ; a s s i i b s e q u e i I t l ^  d \ * t : < » v *:i i * < ::l '* l * - «1 »» > < > * l > p r 
building anomalously had the same ^ddres;, ^^ - ru- * - warrant 
unnecessarily broad, should not now invalidate the warrant. 
POINT I 
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I'iiii iieaiel'i warrant permitted seizure of property described 
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an RCA television with the serial numbers obliterated. The TV 
sufficiently matched the description to permit seizure under the 
warrant. 
Assumingf arguendo, that the seized property did not 
adequately match the warrant description, however, it was still 
properly seized under the "specifically established and well 
delineated exception" to the warrant requirement known as "plain 
view". Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576, 
585, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967). 
Grounded in the proposition that police shouldn't have to 
close their eyes to criminal evidence they can see, three 
requirements justify seizure under this exception: (1) lawful 
presence of the officer; (2) evidence in plain view; and (3) 
evidence which is clearly incriminating. Collidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971); 
State v. Romero, 60 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1983). 
In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed 2d 
502 (1983), the Court clarified the meaning of the phrase 
"evidence which is clearly incriminating" to mean that there 
must be "probable cause to associate the property with criminal 
activity". Ij3 at 741-742. Under this standard, "an officer 
must only have a reasonable belief that certain items may be 
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; 
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct. . 
. • A 'practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating 
evidence is involved is all that is required." Ijd. at 742. 
(Quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 
1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). This language has explicity been 
adopted in Utah in State v. Kelly, supra, at 718 P.2d at 390. 
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 v • « - •• - ^ ! * ••'•'*• • • * 
t 
does not invalidate tr.ir* relief. 
CONCLUSION 
lielenddiit cldimu that th<' description of. defendant hAn.se 
on 1 he warrant invalidates the search. Supplements . *;*•-• 
warrant witl I ui» -* * . ' f .rtate v. 
Anderson clears th:/ c< : < •* . :•* iefendant also ±±a+< tb-**- '-^ 
fact that there ir another bui.diro ^ti « sa^e adores? raises 
the wai idir *•'-!. 
together , ; ^  ».4J * i 
a s c e r t a i n thi cor i e c t desct* i pt i o n of t h e h o ii t.? • a n d t h e 
"i:pasnn11111»' I M' I 11> I i n11 i i 11 i i , 11 v\ I 111 u a r r i s o n v Maryland. 
With a val .• a warrant, the property was lawfully seized. It was 
also proper^ seized under the "plain view" excr t : r i ,e • 1 .s ; < : • 
. 1 3 . 
convictions involving the search warrant were lawfully entered. 
The remaining convictions are outside the purview of this 
appeal. 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this 
Court to affirm the findings, convictions, and sentences of the 
District Court. 
DATED this (0 day of May, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney Genera] 
WILLIAM F. DAINES 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
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